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The Sky’s the Limit  
THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 
 AND CLOUD COMPUTING 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you take a spontaneous trip across the border 
to Canada, just for the night. You leave early the next morning 
to return to the United States, but on the way back, agents 
stop you at the border. You show them your passport, you 
answer their questions, and you do not have a criminal 
background. Yet, they search your car, look through your bags, 
and seize your smartphone and wireless tablet. Then, you wait. 
You may wait a few minutes or several hours. You may even 
return to the United States without your gadgets, which will be 
returned to you in several days.1 While this might all seem 
unfair, border officials are nevertheless free to seize and search 
electronics as they please.2  
Now, what if border agents were to stop and search not 
you but rather a sex offender returning from a trip to Asia, 
where he loaded his laptop full of files of photographs and 
videos of nude children?3 Or what if the person stopped and 
searched had bookmarked a Google Doc,4 which contained 
  
 1 A simple search online reveals these types of border searches are not 
uncommon. See, e.g., Katie Johnston, Laptop Seizures at Customs Cause Thorny Legal 
Dispute, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 8, 2012), http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-08/business/ 
30601167_1_laptops-search-and-seizure-strip-searches (describing the experience of a man 
who took his laptop to Mexico to get work done and had it seized and held for two months 
at the Mexico-U.S. border while it was searched); Jane McLean, Readers Respond: Border 
Crossing Stories, ABOUT.COM, http://gocanada.about.com/u/ua/faqscrossingtheborde1/ 
Border-Crossing-Horror-Stories-Share-Your-Border-Crossing-Horror-Stories.02.htm (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2012) (compiling readers’ comments about their experiences at the 
Canadian-U.S. border, mostly with regard to Canadian border officials).  
 2 Specifically, law enforcement at the border is able to search people and 
property at the border without a warrant, probable cause, or suspicion. See infra Part 
II. Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have expanded this power to data on electronic 
devices. See infra Part II.A.  
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (one of many 
cases where, upon returning from Asia—in Arnold’s case, the Philippines—American 
border officials discovered child pornography during a search of a traveler’s computer).  
 4 Google Docs is a “Web-based word process[or]” that enables instant sharing 
and storing of documents, presentations, or spreadsheets, which anyone in the group 
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information about Improvised Explosive Devices and “jihadist 
material”?5 These kinds of searches have become more common 
in recent years. In fact, government officials searched the 
electronic devices of more than 6500 people crossing the U.S. 
border “between October 2008 and June 2010.”6 These devices 
ranged from laptops to cellular phones and from external hard 
drives to flash drives.7 By far, the device that officials searched 
most frequently was the cellular phone.8 Moreover, as a result 
of these searches, law enforcement might use the files they 
discover as a basis for arresting or excluding these individuals 
from the United States.9 
Although the Fourth Amendment protects “against 
unreasonable search and seizures,”10 the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has given U.S. officials broad 
discretion to conduct warrantless searches at the border.11 In 
August 2009, the agencies of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) both issued 
directives that clarified what exactly this generalized power 
entails.12 Both directives permit border agents to inspect 
  
using the document can edit from any Internet-capable device. Using Google Docs in 
the Classroom: Simple as ABC, GOOGLE.COM, https://docs.google.com/View?docid= 
dcdn7mjg_72nh25vq (last visited Sept. 16, 2012).  
 5 See Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans 
Returning from Overseas Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter S. Comm. Hearing on Laptop 
Searches and Overseas Travel] (statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Comm’r, U.S. 
Customs & Border Protection), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110shrg45091/html/CHRG-110shrg45091.htm.  
 6 Government Data About Searches of International Travelers’ Laptops and 
Personal Electronic Devices, ACLU.ORG (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/government-data-about-searches-international-travelers-laptops-and-personal-
electr [hereinafter ACLU, Government Data]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. During a “nine month period” in 2008, CBP “searched and seized 1,644 
electronic devices.” Hugo Martin, No Curbs on Border Searches of Cellphones, Laptops, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 27, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/travel/ 
2011177028_trbordersearches28.html. Of these devices, “582 were cellphones, 398 were 
laptop computers and 259 were digital cameras. The rest included MP3 players, flash 
drives, hard drives, DVDs and other devices.” Id.  
 9 The discovery of “[t]hese materials have led to the refusal [of] admission 
and the removal of these dangerous people from the United States.” S. Comm. Hearing 
on Laptop Searches and Overseas Travel, supra note 5. 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 11 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BORDER 
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_laptop.pdf. 
 12 See generally U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049, 
BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION (2009) [hereinafter 
CBP DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/ 
elec_mbsa.ctt/elec_mbsa.pdf; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE 
DIRECTIVE NO. 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter 
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electronic devices, such as laptops and cellular phones, and 
examine the information on those devices without any 
“individualized suspicion.”13  
The CBP and ICE derive their authority to conduct 
these inspections from their respective missions to “interdict” 
and “investigate violations of federal law at and related to the 
Nation’s borders.”14 DHS has identified electronic storage of 
data “as the latest method of smuggling . . . material” related to 
criminal activity into the United States.15 Thus, a motivating 
reason for allowing such broad latitude to search people and 
their property at the border lies in preventing illegal activities, 
such as “child pornography; human rights violations; 
smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other contraband; financial 
and trade-related crimes; violations of intellectual property 
rights and law (e.g., economic espionage); . . . [and] violations of 
immigration law,” as well as enforcing national security laws, 
preventing terrorism, and protecting vulnerable infrastructure 
from potential security threats.16 
Nevertheless, opponents of border searches argue that 
electronic devices contain much more information than 
briefcases or luggage, which have historically been searched at 
the border.17 Whereas in the past, a briefcase might have 
contained work materials, notes, and some personal information, 
the current availability, portability, and ease of electronic 
storage means that travelers can carry “exponentially” more 
private information with them at any given time.18 As such, 
opponents argue that the potential invasion of privacy19 during 
  
ICE DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_ 
electronic_devices.pdf. 
 13 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.1.2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 6.1. 
 14 DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 2. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 4. 
 17 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER SEARCHES OF 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S POLICY 1-2 (2011).  
 18 DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 2. Nonetheless, as 
Professor Nathan Alexander Sales pointed out, typical container ships carry between 
5000 and 11,000 twenty-foot cargo containers, yet these container ships have always been 
subjected to suspicionless border searches. Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: 
Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1111 (2009).  
 19 For example, in 2010, the ACLU, New York Civil Liberties Union, and the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a lawsuit on behalf of the 
National Press Photographers Association and Pascal Abidor, a French-American 
citizen, challenging DHS’s electronic border search policy. Abidor was crossing the 
Canada-America border by train when customs officers searched and confiscated his 
laptop. His laptop was returned eleven days later, and there was evidence that 
personal files, such as photographs and chats with his girlfriend, had been searched. 
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border searches of electronic devices is far greater than during 
border searches of nonelectronic items.20 For example, attorneys, 
doctors, accountants,21 and journalists might travel across 
borders with computers and other electronic devices that contain 
privileged attorney-client, doctor-patient, or confidential-source 
information.22 Nevertheless, one might also argue that briefcases 
of such professionals—which have always been subject to 
suspicionless border searches23—would also contain sensitive 
materials. Therefore, other commentators contend that “[l]aptop 
searches are not unique in their ability to reveal sensitive, 
personal information.”24 They base this rationale on a history of 
border searches that has revealed sensitive information, such 
as situations where border officials have opened a sealed letter 
within a package,25 looked through photo albums found within a 
vehicle,26 and opened a sealed envelope found within a briefcase.27 
The latest phenomenon in the computing world is the 
virtualization of computing services—that is, shifting data and 
services from local servers and hard drives to third-party 
  
ACLU in Federal Court Today Challenging Government’s Searches of Laptops at 
Border, ACLU.ORG (July 8, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-
federal-court-today-challenging-governments-searches-laptops-border.  
 20 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 1. 
 21 Although, in the past, these professionals might have carried privileged or 
private information in their briefcase, data storage on electronic devices and on the 
cloud enable individuals to indirectly transport significantly more information. For 
instance, an article in the American Institute of CPAs’ Journal of Accountancy 
describes CPA firms’ transition to electronic storage of data:  
When we were doing the evaluation of the late 1990s, we had massive file rooms 
to hold all of our tax files and audit workpaper files. If you go into a firm or a 
business today, we don’t have file rooms. The file room is on a computer that is 
the size of a small toaster. It’s amazing—that transition from hard copy to 
electronic data . . . . 
Kim Nilsen, Moving the Needle, J. ACCT. (Nov. 2011), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/ 
Issues/2011/Nov/20114396. Although the computer referred to is not necessarily 
connected to the cloud, companies are beginning to transition from storing hard copies 
of files to electronic storage, including electronic storage on third party servers. If a 
traveler has access to these servers on their wireless devices and a search is conducted, 
all of these files could potentially be viewed.  
 22 For example, border agents impounded the laptop of Bill Hogan, a 
freelance journalist, upon his return to the United States from Germany. Fortunately, 
Hogan did not use his laptop for work; however, if he did then he would need to inform 
sources that the government had their information. Alex Kingsbury, Seizing Laptops 
and Cameras Without Cause, U.S. NEWS (June 24, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
national/articles/2008/06/24/seizing-laptops-and-cameras-without-cause.  
 23 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). 
 24 Sales, supra note 18, at 1115.  
 25 United States v. Seljan, 497 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en 
banc granted, 512 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 26 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 27 United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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servers that users can access from anywhere.28 Software 
developers, businesses, and private individuals all around the 
world are beginning to use these virtual servers—known as the 
cloud—and the services they provide.29 Cloud computing 
generally embodies “computing services offered by a third party, 
available for use when needed, that can be scaled dynamically in 
response to changing needs.”30 Cloud users save and share their 
information on remote servers, which third parties own and 
operate and users access through the Internet.31 Any information 
or programs that can be stored on a computer’s local hard drive 
can also be stored on these remote servers.32 Cloud computing 
was first referenced in 1996 in an MIT paper about the 
Internet,33 but it did not launch into existence until 2007 when 
Amazon began providing cloud-computing services.34  
Although the majority of consumers are not familiar 
with cloud computing, research found that 76 percent of 
respondents of an NPD Group poll used cloud-computing 
services, knowingly or unknowingly, within the past year.35 For 
example, antispam email programs tend to be cloud services.36 
Meanwhile, more than 500,000 individuals used Amazon’s 
  
 28 ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS 
TO PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf.  
 29 See JOTHY ROSENBERG & ARTHUR MATEOS, THE CLOUD AT YOUR SERVICE 2 
(2011). Furthermore, in the proposed 2012 Federal Budget the Obama administration 
suggested a “Cloud First Policy,” which would improve government IT inefficiencies 
and the delivery of government services by “requiring agencies to evaluate safe, secure 
cloud computing options before making any new investment.” See VIVEK KUNDRA, 
FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY 2 (Feb. 8, 2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011).  
 30 ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 1. 
 31 GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 4.  
 32 Id.  
 33 ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 8; see Sharon Eisner Gillet & 
Mitchell Kapor, The Self-Governing Internet: Coordination by Design, in 
COORDINATING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 1997), available at http://ccs.mit.edu/papers/ 
CCSWP197/CCSWP197.html.  
 34 ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 8-9.  
 35 Andrew R. Hickey, Cloud Computing Befuddles Consumers, Despite Use: 
Study, CRN.COM (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.crn.com/news/cloud/231300496/cloud-
computing-befuddles-consumers-despite-use-study.htm;jsessionid=gZmvvMv3r7B-
f1qFfqyyOA**.ecappj01. The NPD Group found that “only 22 percent of consumers in 
the U.S. are familiar with the term ‘cloud computing’” but “76 percent of U.S. 
respondents used some form of Internet-based cloud service within the past year.” Id. 
The NPD Group is a market research organization that provides “consumer and retail 
information” to “more than 2000 manufactur[ing], retail, and service companies . . . .” 
About NPD, NPD GROUP, https://www.npd.com/wps/portal/npd/us/aboutnpd/ (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
 36 BRIAN J.S. CHEE & CURTIS FRANKLIN, JR., CLOUD COMPUTING: 
TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE UBIQUITOUS DATA CENTER 82 (2010). 
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cloud within the first eighteen months it was open to the 
public.37 Companies with computer systems that operate on 
private servers have also begun to shift their data to cloud 
servers, which tend to be much less expensive.38 And individual 
Internet consumers use cloud services through email, gaming, 
tax preparation, video and photo sharing, and storing and 
backing up data.39 Moreover, companies such as Verizon, 
AT&T, and Time Warner Cable are beginning to acquire and 
implement cloud services,40 which suggests that major 
companies recognize the large-scale movement of data storage 
to cloud servers, and that an increasing number of people will 
become cloud users as customers of such companies. 
Although travelers might be uncomfortable with 
broadening the scope of the border search doctrine to cloud 
computing, since it will diminish privacy rights at the border, 
this note argues that the border search doctrine should, in fact, 
apply to data stored on the cloud.41 The Supreme Court has not 
yet addressed border searches of electronic devices. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court has carved out a doctrine that gives the 
federal government vast power to search the property of 
individuals who cross the border attempting to enter the United 
States.42 The U.S. Courts of Appeals have taken this breadth of 
authorization and enlarged the scope of the border search 
doctrine even further.43 Based on this expansion, this note will 
demonstrate that it is only logical for courts to extend the border 
search doctrine to virtual data as well as locally stored electronic 
data. To do otherwise would undermine the path that courts 
have already paved and would enable contraband, criminal 
activity, and national security threats to breach our borders. 
  
 37 ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 2.  
 38 Id. at 6.  
 39 Hickey, supra note 35. 
 40 Andrew R. Hickey, Cloud Services: Carriers Want Cloud Control, CRN.COM 
(July 25, 2011), http://www.crn.com/news/networking/231002498/cloud-services-carriers-
want-cloud-control.htm. 
 41 What this note means by accessing the cloud at the border is this: certain 
cloud servers are available with just one click. For example, a Google user might open 
the Internet browser on his iPhone, BlackBerry, or other electronic device, and Google 
might be the default page or it might be easily accessible through the browser’s 
bookmarks. Often, users can store passwords so that once on Google’s web page, the 
user might already be logged in to the site. If this is the case, that user has easy access 
to his email, calendar, photographs, and documents. As a result, a customs officer could 
access all of this information just as easily, with a single click.  
 42 See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 
125-26 (1973) (discussing the Tariff Act of 1930, which gives Congress “plenary 
power . . . to regulate imports” and to prevent contraband from entering the country).  
 43 See infra Part II.A. 
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This note will describe developments in electronic data 
storage and analyze how the border search doctrine applies to 
information stored on the cloud. Part I reviews general Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence within the United States. In 
addition, it focuses on the government’s access to information 
that individuals voluntarily convey to third parties. Part II 
examines an exception to the Fourth Amendment—the border 
search doctrine. This part looks at the evolution of the border 
search doctrine, the justification for and consequences of the 
doctrine, and the federal courts’ treatment of computer and 
electronic-device searches at international borders. Part III 
explores cloud computing. It defines cloud computing, describes 
how it works, and discusses its present role in technology. In 
addition, this part illustrates the complexity that cloud 
computing adds to border searches, since it could expand such 
searches to information not already encompassed within 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV takes a closer look 
at a third party’s access to given information and how this 
relates to data stored on the cloud—that is, on a third party’s 
server. It will question whether Fourth Amendment protection 
should extend to data on the cloud. Finally, Part V analyzes 
how the easy access to data on the cloud plays a role in border 
searches, even when the data itself is not physically located at 
the border. The note’s conclusion synthesizes cloud computing 
and the border search doctrine, and it argues that government 
officials can, in fact, legally access data stored on the cloud 
during searches conducted at the border. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
This section discusses the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
and its exceptions. The Fourth Amendment is important in the 
context of border searches because it typically protects people 
within the United States from warrantless searches and 
seizures.44 The jurisprudence surrounding the Fourth 
Amendment, however, has resulted in a number of exceptions, 
including one for searches at the border. This section begins by 
introducing the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
standard for determining whether a search is unreasonable. 
This section then distinguishes between situations where there 
is an expectation of privacy and situations where there is not, 
  
 44 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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and thus between situations where information is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment and those where it is not, respectively.  
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. When drafting the 
Amendment, the Framers were particularly concerned about 
warrants, abuse of power by new officers, and protecting the 
home.45 The Fourth Amendment guarantees:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.46  
The reasonableness of a search depends on its nature and the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure.47 
Where a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
concerning a certain area, the reasonableness of a search of that 
area depends on “the scope of the particular intrusion, the 
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating 
it, and the place in which it is conducted.”48 Moreover, searches 
executed without a warrant or probable cause of wrongdoing 
are “per se unreasonable” and prohibited by the Constitution.49 
The Fourth Amendment primarily protects against 
warrantless searches and seizures in one’s home.50 This is 
because individuals expect items and information in their 
homes to be preserved as private.51 But Fourth Amendment 
  
 45 Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L. J. 979, 1061 (2011).  
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 47 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985). For example, there 
is no expectation of privacy in information given to third parties: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if 
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.  
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citation omitted). 
 48 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 49 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).  
 50 See United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 
(1971) (“[A] port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let alone neither 
prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials 
when his possession of them is discovered during such a search.”).  
 51 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  
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protection is not limited exclusively to one’s home.52 In Katz v. 
United States, Justice Harlan’s concurrence53 laid out a two-part 
test for determining whether an individual has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, particularly when outside one’s home: (1) 
did the individual “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and (2) is the expectation of privacy “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’?”54 If both questions are 
answered in the affirmative, then law enforcement may not 
access, search, or seize the property or information expected to be 
private, unless they have a warrant. If they take any of these 
steps without a warrant, they would violate the person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.55 Courts may assess the extent to which a 
search infringes upon an individual’s privacy by weighing various 
factors, including the intention of the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment, the way in which the individual uses such location, 
and “our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the 
most scrupulous protection from government invasion.”56 
In certain situations there is no expectation of privacy. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is 
“no . . . expectation of privacy in information . . . voluntarily 
[provided] to third parties.”57 For instance, a person who 
deposits money in a bank has “no legitimate expectation of 
privacy” in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”58 
Similarly, there is no expectation of privacy in the phone 
  
 52 See id. (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. . . . [W]hat 
[a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an areas accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.”).  
 53 Although this test comes from the concurring opinion of Katz, the Supreme 
Court applies this test when determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure. 
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have applied 
the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation 
occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 54 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case the Supreme 
Court examined whether government-initiated recording of a conversation on a 
telephone in a public telephone booth was a “search and seizure” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 348-49, 353. The Court held that electronic surveillance 
of a telephone booth violates the Fourth Amendment because an individual making 
such a phone call “assume[s] that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be 
broadcast to the world.” Id. at 352.  
 55 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The point is . . . that the 
[telephone] booth is . . . a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ 
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”).  
 56 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
 57 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 58 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (internal citations omitted).  
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numbers a person dials.59 In Smith v. Maryland,60 the police, 
without a warrant, asked a telephone company to install a pen 
register61 on the defendant’s telephone number.62 By using the 
pen register, the telephone company and police monitored the 
phone numbers that the defendant dialed and determined that 
he was calling the home of a woman he had robbed.63 Thereafter, 
the defendant was indicted for robbery.64 He moved to suppress 
the pen register evidence against him on the ground that it was 
obtained without a warrant.65 The Supreme Court rejected his 
argument and held that there is no right to privacy for phone 
numbers.66 This is because typical users know that they must 
turn over numerical information—such as phone numbers—to 
the phone company and that the phone company has facilities 
where they record this information for various purposes.67  
There is an important distinction between Katz, where 
the Court held that the government invaded a legitimate 
expectation of privacy by listening to a telephone conversation,68 
and Smith, where the “pen register[] [did] not acquire the 
contents of [the] communication[]” but only acquired the actual 
phone number dialed.69 Indeed, this distinction between the 
content of information and mere identifying information that is 
voluntarily turned over to third parties—such as phone 
numbers dialed—dates back to Supreme Court cases from the 
nineteenth century.70 
  
 59 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.  
 60 See id. at 735. 
 61 “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a 
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone 
is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether 
calls are actually completed.” Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 
US. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)). 
 62 Id. at 737.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 743 (“[I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor 
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain a secret.”).  
 67 Id.  
 68 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 69 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (emphasis in original). 
 70 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he government cannot engage in a warrantless search of the contents of sealed 
mail, but can observe whatever information people put on the outside of mail, because 
that information is voluntarily transmitted to third parties.”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully 
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, 
as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.” 
(emphasis added)).  
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In United States v. Forrester, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit extended this distinction to surveillance of 
e-mail and IP addresses used for Internet communication.71 The 
defendants in Forrester were indicted and arraigned for 
conspiring to manufacture the drug Ecstasy.72 Their indictment 
was partially based on evidence the government obtained by 
monitoring one defendant’s Internet and e-mail activity.73 The 
court held that the monitoring techniques were analogous to the 
pen register used in Smith v. Maryland.74 As the court explained,  
[E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the 
to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the 
websites they visit because they should know that this information is 
provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific 
purpose of directing the routing of information.75  
An important factor considered by the court was that IP 
addresses and to and from addresses in an Internet user’s e-mail 
do not reveal anything more regarding the underlying contents 
of communication than phone numbers do.76 The e-mail and IP 
addresses do not indicate a message’s content or indicate the 
particular pages of websites viewed.77 In fact, the court explicitly 
stated that Forrester’s holding extends only to the “particular 
techniques” used in that case “and does not imply that more 
intrusive techniques or techniques that reveal more content 
information are also constitutionally identical to the use of a pen 
register.”78 As a result, it seems that phone numbers, addresses, 
e-mail addresses, and IP addresses all fall outside the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection, and therefore, government 
officials may monitor and search this “exterior” information 
without violating constitutional rights.  
II. THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE  
There are several exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement for conducting searches. 
These exceptions include searches of items in plain view,79 
  
 71 See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509-10. 
 72 Id. at 505. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 510. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 511.  
 79 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). 
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searches by consent,80 searches “incident to a lawful . . . arrest” 
when “it is reasonable to believe evidence . . . might be found,”81 
searches executed during exigent circumstances or 
circumstances where law enforcement has probable cause to 
believe a crime is being committed,82 and searches at an 
international border or its functional equivalent.83 Furthermore, 
“[t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is 
judged by ‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.’”84 This section focuses on the Fourth 
Amendment exception at international borders or their 
equivalent. It briefly traces the history of this exception and 
then specifically examines government-issued guidelines and 
the approaches various courts have employed, including the 
Fourth Circuit’s refusal to exempt “expressive” items from the 
broad border search power. The second part of this section 
briefly examines the role that computer security, such as 
passwords, plays in border searches.  
Since the ratification of the Constitution, Congress and 
the courts have recognized that government interests at 
international borders weigh more heavily than individual 
Fourth Amendment interests.85 The first Congress granted 
border officials plenary power to conduct warrantless 
searches.86 This power rests on the assumption that searches at 
  
 80 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991). 
 81 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 See Wengert v. State, 771 A.2d 389, 394 (Md. 2001) (citing several Supreme 
Court cases that held exigent circumstances are an exception to the Fourth Amendment). 
 83 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-74 (1973) (“Travellers 
may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self 
protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled 
to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” (quoting 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Examples of the functional equivalent to a U.S. border include “an 
established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more 
roads that extend from the border” or “an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after 
a nonstop flight from Mexico City.” Id. 
 84 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (quoting 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).  
 85 See id.  
 86 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2012).The statute states: 
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, 
search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or 
they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have 
been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether 
by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or 
otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he 
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the border are “qualitatively different” from searches within 
the country. Indeed, border searches help prevent contraband 
from entering the United States altogether.87 As a result, 
“Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not 
subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or warrant . . . .”88 The government may conduct routine 
border stops and searches at fixed checkpoints close to the 
border,89 on boats in U.S. waters at seaports,90 and at 
international airport terminals.91 Nonetheless, if the search 
crosses the line between routine and nonroutine—such as 
searching a person’s alimentary canal—CBP and ICE officials 
must have reasonable suspicion for conducting that search.92  
CBP and ICE directives have established guidelines for 
conducting searches at the border.93 Although the CBP directive 
provides guidelines for handling sensitive material found on 
“electronic devices,” border agents are nonetheless free to 
search through the contents of data stored on such devices.94 As 
a letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson described the 
process, “These [searches] include opening individual laptops; 
reading documents saved on the devices; accessing email 
accounts and reading through emails that have been sent and 
received; examining photographs; looking through personal 
calendars; and going through telephone numbers saved in 
cellular phones.”95 Nevertheless, the ability to inspect the 
content of material finds support from the Supreme Court’s 
  
may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was 
imported contrary to law . . . . 
Id. 
 87 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 538.  
 88 Id. at 539; see also United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(Ely, J., dissenting) (The court upheld the strip search of defendant at the border. 
Dissent stated that this strip search was the type of inspection to “offend the 
sensibilities of any decent citizen,” and the court should not “depart from its 
established principles.”). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976). 
 90 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. 
 91 An international airport is the “functional equivalent of a border” where 
flights arriving from foreign jurisdictions are concerned. Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
States, 413 U.S 266, 273 (1973). 
 92 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. The respondent was convicted 
of unlawful importation of cocaine after inspectors discovered that she had swallowed 
eighty-eight balloons filled with cocaine. Id. at 536. 
 93 See generally CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12. 
 94 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.6. 
 95 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 4. 
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acceptance of border officials opening first-class mail without a 
warrant and with “less than probable cause.”96 
Although searches should typically be conducted in the 
presence of the traveler, in certain situations, searches may be 
conducted outside his or her presence.97 Indeed, CBP permits its 
agents to conduct searches that last up to five days before 
requiring approval, make copies of searched information, and 
transfer devices or copies of information to other federal 
agencies if technical assistance is required.98 ICE allows 
searches to last as long as thirty days before requiring 
approval.99 If a search is conducted away from the immediate 
vicinity of the border, then that search’s legality is determined 
by considering the totality of the circumstances, which includes 
the time that has elapsed since the searched item was at the 
border, the distance from the border, and the manner of the 
search.100 Nonetheless, the border search doctrine is still 
“guided . . . by reason and practicality, not inflexible rules of 
time and space.”101  
A. The Court’s Approach to Border Searches 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the role of 
computers and other electronic devices in the border search 
doctrine.102 In the past decade, however, federal circuit courts 
have addressed this issue and held that searches of computers 
and electronic devices at the border do not require reasonable 
suspicion.103 In United States v. Arnold,104 for example, the Ninth 
  
 96 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538. 
 97 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.1.4; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.1. 
 98 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.3. 
 99 ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.3. 
 100 See United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Nichols, 560 F.2d 1227, 1228 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Alvarado, 510 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 1975).  
 101 United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537).  
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 
2008) (“Although the Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the search of 
computer equipment at the border, other federal courts have agreed that such searches 
do not require reasonable suspicion.”). 
 103 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007); Bunty, 617 F. 
Supp. 2d at 365.  
 104 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005. Arnold arrived at Los Angeles International 
Airport from a flight from the Philippines and was selected for secondary questioning, 
where CBP officials asked him to power on his computer. Id. CBP officials then opened 
photograph files on Arnold’s laptop, in which they found pictures of nude women. Id. A 
continued search of his photographs led to what officials believed was child 
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Circuit discussed the types of items the government may 
legally search at the border.105 These items include places where 
a traveler attempts to conceal objects, such as “the contents of a 
traveler’s briefcase and luggage, . . . a traveler’s ‘purse, wallet, or 
pockets,’. . . papers found in containers such as pockets, . . . [and] 
pictures, films and other graphic materials.”106 At the border, the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect these items—that is, 
“particularized suspicion” is not required for these items to be 
searched.107 Even so, there is a point where searches of these 
items become unreasonable.108 But the Supreme Court has left 
unclear whether and when “a border search might be deemed 
‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in 
which it is carried out.”109 Indeed, in United States v. Vance,110 
the Ninth Circuit applied a sliding scale and held that “as [a] 
search becomes more intrusive [to the human body], more 
suspicion is [required].”111 But the Supreme Court subsequently 
clarified that this sliding-scale test does not apply to searches 
of vehicles at the border.112  
One court has found that computer searches are more 
similar to vehicle searches than to the search of a person at the 
border.113 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
“reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to 
search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at 
the border,” and accordingly, the sliding-scale test does not 
apply.114 Thus, it is much more difficult to determine when a 
search of an electronic device crosses the line from reasonable 
  
pornography. Id. Although Arnold argued that a computer is similar to a home, 
because individuals store personal documents on their laptops, much like they do in 
their homes, the court rejected this argument and refused to distinguish a “laptop and 
its electronic contents . . . from . . . travelers’ luggage . . . .” Id. at 1006, 1009. The court 
held that “reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or 
other personal electronic storage devices at the border.” Id. at 1008.  
 105 Id. at 1007. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id. 
 108 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (1977). 
 109 Id. at 618 n.13; United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004).  
 110 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 111 Id.  
 112 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. 
 113 United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“The 
Defendant would have this Court impute the same level of privacy and dignity afforded 
to the sovereignty of a person’s being to an inanimate object like a computer. The Court 
finds this argument without merit. . . . [T]his Court cannot equate the search of a 
computer with the search of a person. The Court finds that the search of a computer is 
more analogous to the search of a vehicle and/or its contents.”).  
 114 United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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to unreasonable.115 To add to this difficulty, the Ninth Circuit 
did not distinguish between a closed container, such as a 
briefcase, and an electronic device.116 In fact, the court treated 
them the same.117 Various courts, when referring to Arnold, 
have reinforced this treatment by holding that “[a] computer is 
entitled to no more protection than any other container.”118  
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit refused to carve out a 
border search exception for computers based on the First 
Amendment.119 In United States v. Ickes, a customs inspector 
searched Ickes’s van as he entered the United States from 
Canada.120 CBP officials searched his vehicle and found his 
computer, which contained child pornography.121 Ickes then 
challenged his conviction for transporting child pornography by 
arguing that the search of his computer was unconstitutional 
because “expressive” items are exempt from the border search 
doctrine.122 The court, however, rejected this argument.123 It 
reasoned that a principal justification for the border search 
doctrine is to give the United States the ability to protect itself.124 
“Terrorist communications,” which can be stored on electronic 
devices, “are inherently expressive.”125 Therefore, if the court held 
for the defendant’s asserted legal analysis, then the precedent 
would undermine one of the essential goals of border security—
preventing terrorism.126 
  
 115 See United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Customs Officers exercise broad authority to conduct routine searches and seizures 
for which the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant, consent, or reasonable 
suspicion. . . . Data storage media and electronic equipment, such as films, computer 
devices, and videotapes, may be inspected and viewed during a reasonable border 
search.” (citations omitted)). 
 116 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (The defendant “failed to distinguish how the 
search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any different from the 
suspicionless border searches of travelers’ luggage that the Supreme Court and we 
have allowed.”).  
 117 Id. at 1009-10.  
 118 People v. Endacott, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 909 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2008); 
see also United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (“Courts have 
uniformly agreed that computers should be treated as if they were closed containers.”).  
 119 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 120 Id. at 502. 
 121 Id. at 503. 
 122 Id. at 506. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126 Additionally, a Pennsylvania court has held that government officials may 
search computer equipment found in luggage without reasonable suspicion. United 
States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
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The Ninth Circuit has held that “the government must be 
reasonably certain that the object of a border search has crossed 
the border [in order] to conduct a valid border search.”127 As a 
result, in the context of border searches of devices that contain 
information stored remotely on the cloud, courts must first 
address a threshold question: does the border search doctrine 
apply to data stored on servers that are not physically located at 
the border? In other words, can border officials access virtually 
stored information, or is a virtual inspection unreasonable? 
B. The Role of Computer Security 
Although circuit courts have not explicitly addressed the 
role that passwords play when conducting a border search, it 
seems possible that password security does little to actually 
prevent border officials from searching electronic devices. For 
example, as the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Texas found, “A password on a computer does not automatically 
convert a routine search into a non-routine search. A password 
is simply a digital lock.”128 Luggage and briefcases usually have 
locks, yet they are “subject to ‘routine’ searches at ports of entry 
all the time.”129 In United States v. Bunty, border agents simply 
asked the defendant to provide them with the passwords to two 
laptop computers and informed him that his refusal would lead 
the government to hire someone else to access the contents of 
the computers.130 After the defendant challenged the legality of 
the search, the district court held that nothing indicated that 
the search of the computer was any different from a routine 
computer search at the border.131  
In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court and held that border officials in 
Arizona lawfully searched the contents of Howard Cotterman’s 
computer, even though the border agents detained and 
transported the computer to a forensic computer laboratory 170 
miles away.132 At first, officials were limited in what they could 
  
 127 United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We have held the 
government must be reasonably certain that the object of the border search has crossed 
the border to conduct a valid border search.” (citing United States v. Corral-Villavicencio, 
753 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Garcia, 415 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1969))). 
 128 United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
 129 Id. (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154-55 (2004)). 
 130 Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
 131 Id. at 365. 
 132 637 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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inspect on the computer because “many of [the] files were 
password protected.”133 After Cotterman failed to provide the 
passwords, however, an ICE official “bypass[ed] [the] computer 
security and open[ed] twenty-three of the password protected 
files.”134 Without addressing the legality of the particular act of 
bypassing the password protection, the court held that the 
search of the computer files was lawful.135 
These cases support law enforcement’s power to search 
files stored on a traveler’s computer and electronic devices at the 
border without a warrant or reasonable suspicion.136 
Additionally, they suggest that computer searches are lawful 
even if the devices or files are protected by security features.137 In 
the last several years, technological innovations have led more 
and more people to store data in places other than their hard 
drives, such as external and third-party servers. If these files are 
password protected, what does it mean for agents at the border?  
III. THE MECHANICS OF THE CLOUD  
Cloud computing is “the sharing or storage by users of 
their own information on remote servers owned or operated by 
others and accessed through the Internet or other connections.”138 
“Any information [that can be] stored locally on a computer,” such 
as on a hard drive, can also be stored on the cloud.139 “Cloud 
computing . . . is physically limitless,” since it “can . . . be accessed 
by users ‘on demand’ from virtually anywhere with an Internet 
connection with minimal administrative effort.”140 Google’s free e-
mail service, Gmail, is an example of cloud computing.141 This 
  
 133 Id. at 1071. 
 134 Id. at 1073. 
 135 Id. at 1070. 
 136 In Romm, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the “internet cache” on 
the defendant’s computer, and held that customs agents could gain access to this data 
through the border search doctrine. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 
2006). The court defined Internet cache as “a set of files on the user’s hard drive” that 
are “kept by a web browser to avoid having to download the same material repeatedly. 
Most web browsers keep copies of all the web pages that you view, up to a certain limit, 
so that the same images can be redisplayed quickly when you go back to them.” Id. at 
993 n.1 (quoting DOUGLAS DOWNING ET AL., DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET 
TERMS 149 (Barron’s 8th ed. 2003)). 
 137 See e.g., United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (W.D. Tex. 2008); 
United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Cotterman, 637 F.3d at 1070. 
 138 GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 4. There is debate about this definition. Id. at 4 n.1. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Tip of the Month: Managing the Risks of Cloud Computing, MAYER BROWN 
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=10088&nid=6. 
 141 Id.  
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“means that any user’s email ‘mailbox’ may actually be stored in 
one of several different servers located all over the world and can 
easily be accessed from anywhere on the Internet.”142 
In order for the cloud to operate, basic technology and 
infrastructure are required.143 The “cloud needs servers on a 
network, and [these servers] need a home.”144 The physical 
home of these servers is called the data center.145 Companies 
like Google, Amazon, and Microsoft “have . . . built up . . . ‘mega 
data centers’ [comprising] thousands of servers.”146 These large 
companies usually build data centers in geographic regions 
where server use is high and where there is easy access to 
inexpensive power, like in the Northwest.147 Cloud consumers 
may or may not know the actual location of the data center 
they are using.148 Additionally, it is possible to simultaneously 
store data in multiple places at one time.149  
Cloud services can be used for a number of different 
reasons by both business organizations and individual users. 
For example, the New York Times needed to convert eleven 
million archived articles into PDF files in order to make them 
accessible online.150 It estimated that this would require 
“hundreds of servers,”151 at least four terabytes152 of storage, and 
“a months-long delay.”153 So instead of undertaking this project 
  
 142 Id.  
 143 Cloud computing also requires virtualized servers, “an access API,” 
storage, a database, and “elasticity as a way to expand and contract applications.” 
ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 19. The API is the way to access the cloud; it 
is “what the dashboard and controls are to a car.” Id. at 27.  
 144 Id. at 19.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 19-20. 
 147 Id. at 20. 
 148 GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 19. 
 149 Id. at 18. The locations of some data centers, however, are available. See 
e.g., Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/ 
locations/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (providing a map with the locations of 
its data centers around the world). Microsoft and Yahoo! built data centers in Quincy, 
Washington. ROSENBERG & MATEOS, supra note 29, at 22.  
 150 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 77.  
 151 Id.  
 152 A terabyte is a unit of computer data space: 
A Terabyte is approximately one trillion bytes, or 1,000 Gigabytes. . . . To put it 
in some perspective, a Terabyte could hold about 3.6 million 300 Kilobyte images 
or maybe about 300 hours of good quality video. A Terabyte could hold 1,000 
copies of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Ten Terabytes could hold the printed 
collection of the Library of Congress.  
Megabytes, Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are They?, WHAT’S A BYTE?, 
http://www.whatsabyte.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).  
 153 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 77.  
682 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
on its own, the New York Times employed a cloud service, 
Amazon Web Services, which, for $240, was able to process the 
conversion of eleven million files and store four terabytes of 
data by the next day.154 As evidenced by the New York Times, 
companies are beginning to use (or have been using) cloud 
services like “computing and storage to smooth out usage 
spikes and avoid upgrading data centers to size capacity for 
spikes rather than ‘normal’ usage.”155 On the other hand, 
individual users most often encounter and use the cloud for 
data storage.156 If a person’s computer crashes but that user’s 
information is also stored on the cloud, then that person can 
access the data from a different computer. Unlike with the local 
hard drive, data is not lost forever. 
Google, in particular, has advanced “the technological 
bounds of cloud computing for more than [a decade].”157 Google 
offers a variety of free online applications located in the cloud,158 
which are designed to “divorce” users from desktop operating 
systems.159 Through Google, users can “check [their] Gmail, type 
up a memo on Google docs, manage [their] photos with Picasa, 
read all [their] favorite sites with Google Reader, and store it 
all on Google’s servers—allowing [the user] to access it from 
any computer”160 or Internet-capable device—even a cell phone. 
Instead of providing a separate cloud storage system, 
“Google . . . provid[es] storage through [its applications].”161 
Interestingly, Google visitors can go into “incognito” mode 
while using Google’s web browser, Chrome.162 Incognito mode 
does not record the sites that Chrome users visit on their hard 
drives; nevertheless, the sites visited are still recorded on the 
server.163 Google does not own the data that business 
  
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 78. 
 156 Id. at 80. 
 157 Cloud Computing Benefits: Top Ten Advantages of Google’s Cloud, 
NEXIO.COM, http://googleapps.nexio.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=62&Itemid=229&lang=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
 158 Brian Braiker, The Cloud’s Chrome Lining, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2008, 8:00 
PM), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/01/the-cloud-s-chrome-
lining.html.  
 159 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 125. 
 160 Braiker, supra note 158.  
 161 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 81. 
 162 Braiker, supra note 158. 
 163 Id. By virtue of the fact that users are employing incognito mode, they 
must be surfing websites that they expect to remain private. This prompts an 
interesting question: If border officials do have access to data on the cloud through the 
border search doctrine, and since the incognito sites are recorded on Google’s server, do 
border officials have access to these incognito websites when they conduct a search? 
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organizations and individuals store on Google’s cloud.164 
Accordingly, Google will not share data, except as noted in its 
privacy policy. There, Google states that it will share a user’s 
information if, among other reasons: 
[Google has] a good-faith belief that access, use, preservation or 
disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary to . . . meet any 
applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental 
request[,] . . . . enforce applicable Terms of Service, including 
investigation of potential violations[,] . . . . detect, prevent, or 
otherwise address fraud, security or technical issues[, or] . . . . 
protect against harm to the rights, property or safety of Google, [its] 
users or the public as required or permitted by law.165 
Furthermore, users may remove data from Google’s cloud at will.166 
Another preeminent cloud service provider, Amazon, 
offers a variety of cloud web services for both business and 
personal use.167 Amazon S3 is a “Simple Storage Service”168 that is 
frequently encountered by individual users and is “available for 
just about every [computer] operating system.”169 Amazon S3 
has a simple interface and enables users to store and access 
“any amount of data, at any time, from anywhere on the web.”170  
According to Amazon Web Services (AWS), “AWS data 
centers are housed in nondescript facilities, and critical 
facilities have extensive setback and military grade perimeter 
control berms as well as other natural boundary protection.”171 
Users of AWS must provide Amazon with information related 
to the content of their data on the cloud, in order to ensure 
compliance, and Amazon “may monitor the external interfaces” 
  
 164 Security First, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/business/ 
infrastructure_security.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
 165 Privacy Center, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last 
modified July 27, 2012).  
 166 Dan Rowinski, How Does Google Protect Your Data in the Cloud?, 
READWRITE (July 22, 2011), http://readwrite.com/2011/07/22/how_does_google_protect_ 
your_data_in_the_cloud (“Google promises that data can be taken out of the cloud at 
any time and promises that it will be completely eradicated within 60 days (though 
usually much sooner).”). 
 167 For a detailed description of Amazon Web Services (AWS), see About AWS, 
AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/what-is-aws/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
For a detailed description of all of the services that AWS offers, see Products & Services, 
AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/products/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
 168 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 80. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171 Amazon Web Services: Overview of Security Processes, AMAZON WEB 
SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/articles/1697 (last updated Sept. 4, 2012). 
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of that content172—language that seems to parallel the 
monitoring techniques of telephone companies. But Amazon 
will not monitor the actual content of the data.173 In fact, its 
terms of service permit users to encrypt such data so that it 
remains confidential.174 With respect to users’ privacy, Amazon 
“release[s] account and other personal information when [it] 
believe[s] release is appropriate to comply with the law.”175 It 
seems that information users provide to Amazon, such as when 
they “search, buy, post, participate in a contest or 
questionnaire, or communicate with customer service,”176 is the 
type of information collected and potentially shared by Amazon 
with law enforcement. 
Cloud computing is a “$150 billion phenomenon,”177 and 
it is becoming more ubiquitous.178 The essential benefit of cloud 
computing—and data storage in particular—is that information 
can be accessed from any location. Nationwide retail businesses 
can back up their inventory data from anywhere,179 a team 
working on one document or project can collaborate on it from 
different locations and on different operating systems,180 and 
retail consumers can store credit-card information online and 
use it to pay for merchandise in a few simple clicks.181  
If the border search doctrine allows border security 
agents to access data saved on the cloud, it will enable 
government officials to reach into an area uncomfortable for 
  
 172 AWS Service Terms, ¶ 1.3, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/ 
serviceterms/ (last updated Sept. 4, 2012).  
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Privacy Notice, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ 
ref=hp_468496_share?nodeId=468496&#share (last updated Apr. 6, 2012). 
 176 Id. 
 177 The King of Cloud: Q&A with Mark Benioff, TECH. REV. (Oct. 28, 2011), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/business/38851/?mod=chfeatured. 
 178 Id. (“In the future, all software will be delivered in the cloud. . . . People 
will access all the services they need via the Web . . . .”).  
 179 Cloud Computing: Definition, Advantages and Why You Should Switch, 
GENIE9 OFFICIAL BLOG, http://blog.genie9.com/index.php/2011/03/29/cloud-computing-
defenition-advantages-and-why-you-should-switch (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).  
 180 CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 16. 
 181 PayPal, an online service that “allows [users] to send money without 
sharing financial information” by storing credit card numbers and bank accounts, uses 
a “cloud-based payments system.” Welcome to the Press Center, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal-media.com/about (last visited Sept. 17, 2012); PayPal Boss 
Thompson Decamps for Yahoo Just as Key POS Strategy Unfolds, DIGITAL 
TRANSACTIONS (Jan. 4, 2012), http://digitaltransactions.net/news/story/3383. The 
reliance on the cloud is one way that PayPal successfully protected its website and 
users from an Internet attack. Sean Sposito, PayPal Tries Cloud Cover to Fend Off 
Further Attacks, AM. BANKER (Jan. 6, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/ 
issues/176_5/paypal-cloud-computing-1030928-1.html.  
2013] CLOUD COMPUTING AT THE BORDER 685 
many—for example, private pictures or appointments on a 
calendar, diary entries, and confidential work information, to 
name a few. Extending the border search doctrine poses the 
same risks that the circuit courts disregarded by allowing border 
officials to search electronic devices.182 These risks are even 
greater with the prevalence of smartphones, which are Internet-
ready and provide easy access to virtual servers, e-mail, credit-
card information, and work-related documents. Officials will be 
able to access virtual calendars and address books, inventory 
data, archived business information,183 photos, chats, and other 
sensitive information that is not necessarily stored locally on 
an electronic device. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, the 
interests of the U.S. government tend to outweigh the privacy 
rights of individuals at the border, and it may be difficult to 
establish an appropriate area to draw the line.184 
IV. DOES SMITH V. MARYLAND APPLY TO CLOUD 
COMPUTING? 
An examination of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Smith v. Maryland and its application to cloud computing 
indicate that data stored on the cloud should be protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. Smith v. Maryland stands for the idea 
that individuals have “no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information [they] voluntarily turn over to third parties.”185 As a 
result, government efforts to access that information are “not a 
‘search’” under the Fourth Amendment.186 In the context of 
cloud computing, this case is helpful in analyzing whether 
users have a legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
they store on the cloud, given that these users similarly turn 
over information to the third-party service providers who own 
and operate the servers.  
The answer to this question is important to determining 
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection available to cloud 
users. If these users have no legitimate expectation of privacy, 
then data stored on the cloud would not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection, regardless of whether that information 
is accessed within the United States or at an international 
  
 182 For a discussion of the case law surrounding the border search doctrine 
and how it applies to electronic devices, see supra Part II. 
 183 See supra note 179. 
 184 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985). 
 185 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
 186 Id. at 746. 
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border. But if these users have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy, then the Fourth Amendment should protect such data 
from being searched without a warrant, unless such search 
falls under an exception—for example, the border exception.  
This note asserts that the facts of Smith v. Maryland 
are distinguishable from the cloud-computing context because, 
unlike the phone numbers acquired by the pen register, users 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information they 
store on the cloud. Indeed, the Smith court drew a critical 
distinction between government interventions that capture the 
content of a phone conversation, such as the wiretap at issue in 
Katz v. United States,187 and government investigations that 
merely access information conveyed to a third party, such as 
the phone numbers at issue in Smith. Pursuant to this 
distinction, data stored on the cloud would seem closely 
analogous to the information in Katz. As a result, it would be 
inappropriate to exclude that information from Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
As mentioned above, courts have routinely held that 
information conveyed to a third party—that is, mere external 
information—is not information that individuals expect to 
remain private.188 Rather, because an individual or business 
organization furnishes information to a third party, that 
individual or organization loses its expectation of privacy in the 
information.189 As such, government officials can access that 
information, even in the absence of a warrant, because 
obtaining it would not constitute a search.190  
Admittedly, when users store files and data on third-
party cloud services, they are furnishing information to third 
parties. While cloud service providers are very similar to 
telephone companies and the services they offer, cloud-
computing encompasses the disclosure of information that is 
different in kind from the information provided to telephone 
companies in Smith.  
  
 187 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“One who occupies [a 
telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to 
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world.”). 
 188 For a discussion of information given to third parties and privacy 
expectations, see supra Part I.  
 189 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. (“What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).  
 190 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. 
2013] CLOUD COMPUTING AT THE BORDER 687 
Telephone and cloud services both provide a means of 
communication. The cloud provides a means of communication 
via e-mail communication, as well as a means of accessing one’s 
own data from various locations—essentially communicating 
with oneself. Telephone service providers keep records of call 
logs and phone numbers dialed. But these phone service 
providers do not typically record or eavesdrop on phone 
conversations.191 Similarly, it is not necessary for cloud service 
providers to examine the content of users’ data. Service 
providers may keep records of how much data an individual or 
organization stores on the cloud and the bandwidth each user 
consumes, but this is most likely for billing purposes.192 Cloud 
service providers may even record the kinds of data users store 
on the cloud for marketing or development purposes. It 
appropriately follows that the only information that cloud users 
voluntarily convey to third parties is the amount of data they 
are storing and the types of files being stored. Users are not 
voluntarily conveying the content of their information to third 
parties, and so users never relinquish their expectation of 
privacy regarding such content. Thus, the content of the 
information stored on the cloud is much more similar to the 
content of the phone conversation in Katz. Therefore, the 
Fourth Amendment should still protect the content of users’ 
data from being searched in the absence of a warrant. 
Cloud computing is distinguishable from the situation of 
United States v. Miller,193 where government officials were 
permitted to access the content of financial information.194 
Unlike cloud service providers, banks play an active role in the 
content of the information that individuals provide to them. A 
depositor goes to the bank with the intention of depositing 
money. The depositor hands over a check to a bank teller or 
inserts a check into an ATM. That teller or machine reads the 
content of the check to determine the exact amount being 
deposited and then deposits that amount into the depositor’s 
bank account. Unlike the mere recording of dialed phone 
  
 191 In Smith, the police had to request that the phone service use a pen 
register recording device, which indicates that this is not an ordinary business practice. 
442 U.S. at 737.  
 192 Most cloud service providers allow users to store a certain amount of data 
for free and once a user exceeds that free amount the users are billed according to how 
much storage space they use. Services also charge for the amount of bandwidth used. 
See CHEE & FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 118-19. 
 193 For a discussion of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), see supra Part I.  
 194 Miller, 425 U.S. at 438. 
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numbers by telephone service providers, it is the job of the 
bank to account for the contents of a user’s bank account and to 
provide the bank user with the fluctuations in his or her stock 
portfolio. Whereas phone companies keep track of the numbers 
dialed and e-mail service providers keep track of to and from 
email addresses,195 banks do not just focus on who wrote the 
check and who is depositing it. Instead, they also carefully 
examine what the check says—including the amount to be 
transferred—in order to fulfill their obligations to deposit the 
check, transfer funds, and monitor the depositor’s account. 
As discussed, cloud users do not voluntarily convey the 
content of their data to cloud service providers, and so the 
holding of Smith v. Maryland does not apply to virtual 
information. As a result, the Fourth Amendment protects 
information stored on the cloud, and government officials may 
not access that information without a warrant. Nevertheless, 
the question remains: does this data come under an exception? 
More specifically, may law enforcement access this data 
without a warrant if an individual carries an electronic device 
across an international border? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to determine whether the border search doctrine 
applies to this information.  
V. BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE AND INFORMATION ON THE 
CLOUD 
If the third-party exception from Part IV does not apply 
to data stored on the cloud, then what does it mean for 
searches at the border? The data is not physically located at 
the border, but it is easily accessible from a computer, 
smartphone, tablet, or any other Internet-ready wireless device 
located at the border. Furthermore, it is possible to require 
passwords to gain access to cloud programs stored on wireless 
devices. Do CBP and ICE officials need warrants to access such 
data, or can they access it without a warrant or reasonable 
suspicion at the border, as law enforcement agents within the 
Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction are permitted to do?  
It seems logical that the border search doctrine does, in 
fact, encompass information that is stored on the cloud and 
accessible through an electronic device. In developing the 
precedent surrounding the border search doctrine, the Supreme 
  
 195 For a discussion of United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008), 
see supra Part I.  
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Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals have emphasized that 
the interests of the U.S. government (in preventing contraband 
and threats to security from breaching U.S. borders) outweigh 
interests of individuals who cross the border.196 If courts, upon 
hearing a case concerning border officials’ search of cloud data, 
were to rule that accessing such information at the border falls 
outside the scope of the border search doctrine, then courts 
would permit U.S. entrants to circumvent DHS policies and 
U.S. common law. As a result, instead of storing contraband or 
evidence of illegal activity on local hard drives, savvy entrants 
would store this material on the cloud, knowing that it could 
not be accessed by government agents. This would “undermine 
the compelling reasons that lie at the very heart of the border 
search doctrine.”197 
A. Data Not Physically at the Border and Passwords 
A cloud user’s data itself is stored on a server that is not 
at the border but is instead in a discreet location.198 A number of 
cloud service providers house servers in the Northwest;199 yet, 
most service agreements do not disclose where servers are 
located, and the location of smaller cloud service providers may 
not be available at all.200 As a result, unlike with data on a local 
hard drive, the information on the cloud does not physically 
cross the border with the traveler.  
Does this mean, then, that because the data is not 
physically crossing the border, border officials are unable to 
search such data under the border search doctrine? This seems 
unlikely. In United States v. Romm, the defendant “never 
legally crossed the U.S.-Canadian border” because, although he 
flew to Canada, Canadian border officials refused to admit him 
into the country.201 Romm argued that because of this, “he [could] 
not [be] subject to a warrantless border search.”202 The fact that 
Romm physically crossed the border, though illegally, prompted 
the Ninth Circuit to reject this argument.203 As the court 
  
 196 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985). 
 197 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 198 See supra Part III for a discussion of where certain large cloud companies 
have built data centers. 
 199 See supra Part III.  
 200 See GELLMAN, supra note 28, at 18. 
 201 United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 202 Id. at 996 (emphasis omitted). 
 203 Id. 
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explained, “[T]he issue was whether the person searched had 
physically crossed the border.”204 Therefore, by virtue of the fact 
that a traveler crosses an international border, it is possible that 
data on any Internet-ready device—which the traveler carries 
while physically crossing the border—is searchable, regardless 
of whether the data itself physically crossed the border. It is less 
clear, however, how other circuit courts would interpret this 
situation, since none have spoken to this issue.  
What if border officials seize a traveler’s laptop or 
mobile device and try to access data that is on the cloud, but 
that data is password protected or encrypted? Certainly cloud 
users may protect their information with passwords or 
encryptions in order to keep the content of their files 
confidential.205 Although the Ninth Circuit and several district 
courts have upheld border searches of computer files where 
border officials bypassed the password protection, courts have 
not explicitly addressed the effects of password protection on 
border searches.206 Nonetheless, by following the scant authority 
that exists, it is plausible that passwords fail to generate 
sufficient protection at the border. 
Users can store passwords on their computers, 
smartphones, and on certain websites in order to free 
themselves from having to input the password every time they 
access their cloud servers. If a password is stored in an 
Internet-ready device, border officials might view this as 
consent from the device’s owner to access that information. 
With respect to situations where the password is not stored on 
the device, courts have not yet taken issue with border agents 
asking for that password or having forensic experts bypass the 
security system, as in Cotterman.207 If a traveler refuses to 
comply with requests for a password, the traveler’s refusal 
might result in the device being detained for a longer period of 
time while the agents determine how to access the 
information.208 One way they might access the protected data is 
by requesting it from cloud service providers—many of which 
  
 204 Id. (emphasis added). 
 205 For example, Amazon’s Terms of Service permits encryption of content. See 
supra note 172 and accompanying text.  
 206 See supra Part II.B. 
 207 See generally United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (2011).  
 208 See United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 363-64 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
Agents allowed Bunty to leave but detained his laptop in order to determine how to 
access password-protected information. Id. 
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will share a user’s information in order to comply with requests 
from law enforcement.209 
As a result, it is possible that passwords have little 
relevance in the border search context. If passwords were truly 
able to thwart access by border officials, then the ability to 
password protect cloud data would undermine the justifications 
of the border search doctrine—namely, preventing contraband 
and terrorism from penetrating the United States.  
B. Data Can Be Accessed at the Border 
This note concludes that the border search doctrine 
does, in fact, apply to data stored on the cloud. The Supreme 
Court has carved out a doctrine that gives the federal 
government great power in searching the property of 
individuals who cross an international border and enter the 
United States.210 This doctrine—along with jurisprudence in the 
circuit courts regarding warrantless searches of electronic 
devices at the border and the directives of the CBP and ICE—
guides the conclusion that warrantless searches of data stored 
on the cloud are acceptable when executed near the border. If 
the purposes of the CBP and ICE directives are to prevent the 
smuggling of contraband into the United States, stop those 
engaged in criminal conduct, and thwart threats to national 
security, then certainly data on the cloud should not be 
excluded from the border search exception. It would be illogical 
to allow border agents to search local hard drives of travelers’ 
computers without suspicion or consent, and yet preclude those 
agents from opening files accessible on the same devices but 
not stored locally. This would enable travelers to bypass CBP 
and ICE’s search procedures, and it would permit them to 
bring in the very same contraband and execute the very same 
conduct that the border search doctrine is intended to prevent.  
C. Should There Be a Limit? 
While this note argues that the government should have 
access to data stored on the cloud since it serves the purposes 
of the border search doctrine, this note does not necessarily 
assert that the extension of the border search doctrine would be 
  
 209 See discussion of Terms and Conditions of various cloud service providers 
supra Part III. 
 210 See supra Part II. 
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beneficial. Expanding the border search doctrine to a realm 
that is becoming more and more ubiquitous will continue to 
subvert privacy interests that are only modestly protected even 
under current law. Therefore, border searches should be 
limited in a way to protect privacy interests as much as 
possible. This section outlines the difficulties of an expanded 
border search doctrine, discusses the self-imposed limits that 
already exist, and suggests limits for the future.  
One problem with digital devices, as one court noted, is 
that they “are not just repositories of data, but access points, or 
portals, to other digital devices and data, typically obtained 
through the internet or stored on a network. All data on the 
internet is both separate and one.”211 In a case where the 
government filed an application for a warrant for all passwords 
and encryption codes for the files on the suspect’s computer,212 
the court called the warrant “boundless.”213 
This is made evident by the fact that the government seeks 
authorization, among other things, to obtain “all passwords, password 
files, test keys, encryption codes or other information necessary to 
access the computer equipment, storage devices or data.” . . . This poses 
a multitude of problems . . . . First, once the government has all 
passwords, it is able to access a defendant’s most sensitive information. 
To the extent the defendant may have medical records on-line, that 
information is now available to the government. If the defendant’s wife, 
who is not alleged to be involved in any criminal activity, is sending 
embarrassing, private e-mail messages, that information is now 
available for use by the government. If the government wants to see 
what books the defendant is reading, or what movies his wife is 
viewing, all of this would be fair game under the warrant presented by 
the government. Moreover, if the defendant has been looking at legal 
but “dirty” pictures the government will know this as well, even if the 
defendant had intended to “throw them away.”214  
If border officials are able to obtain access to password-
protected or encrypted files stored on the cloud by asking 
travelers for their security codes or passwords—or by 
bypassing them—cloud users will face the same challenges 
described above. Accordingly, the question becomes whether 
  
 211 In re United States’ Application for a Search Warrant to Seize & Search 
Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 212 The location of the place to be searched was within the United States, not at a 
border. The government applied for a warrant to search the suspect’s apartment, located at 
“2305 Rucker Avenue # 5, Everett, Washington.” Id. at 1139. Thus, Fourth Amendment 
protections applied and a warrant was necessary. At the border, however, obtaining a 
warrant is not a necessary prerequisite to conducting a search. See supra Part II. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 1145 (citation omitted). 
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there should be a limit to what border officials may access and 
whether their searches should be limited in scope.  
One might argue that self-imposed limits to the border 
search doctrine already exist. For instance, more than one 
million people travel across American borders every day, but 
neither CBP nor ICE has the resources to conduct searches on 
every individual crossing the border.215 Instead, DHS has 
emphasized that searches are typically based on 
“circumstances . . . which give rise to . . . suspicion”216—for 
example, nervous behavior—“even though courts have repeatedly 
confirmed that . . . suspicion is not required . . . .”217  
Moreover, the CBP and ICE directives do require greater 
protection of sensitive material.218 If border agents come across 
material protected by attorney-client privilege or other sensitive 
information,219 they must consult the CBP Associate or Assistant 
Chief Counsel before continuing with the search.220 CBP counsel 
will collaborate with the United States Attorney’s Office regarding 
the privileged attorney information.221 All other sensitive business 
and commercial information will be treated as confidential, and 
“[i]nformation . . . determined to be protected by law as privileged 
or sensitive will only be shared with federal agencies that have 
mechanisms in place to protect appropriately such information.”222 
ICE’s policy directive contains similar limitations.223 
Furthermore, it is safe to bet that border officials cannot 
access the data of travelers who do not transport computers or 
other Internet-ready devices over the border, even if border 
agents are capable of accessing cloud servers through their own 
devices. Although the holding in Romm is based on the fact 
that the person whose effects were searched physically crossed 
the border,224 broadening this principle to include situations 
where that person does not carry an electronic device would 
exceed the bounds of the court’s holding and most likely be 
unreasonable. Because the traveler is not carrying such devices, 
there would be no reason for border agents even to suspect that 
  
 215 S. Comm. Hearing on Laptop Searches and Overseas Travel, supra note 5.  
 216 Id.  
 217 Id. 
 218 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.2; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.6. 
 219 Sensitive information means medical records and journalistic work-related 
data. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.2. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. § 5.2.4. 
 223 ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 8.5. 
 224 United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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the individual stores data on the cloud, unless law enforcement 
searched cloud servers for data about every person crossing the 
U.S. border. This seems unlikely, however. Accordingly, border 
agents would have no basis for searching this information 
through computers or electronic devices present at the border. 
In his article, Professor Sales suggests that law 
enforcement adopt a policy of “use limits” regarding acquired 
data.225 Use limits “seek to promote privacy by limiting what the 
government may do with the data it does collect, such as 
restricting the sharing of information.”226 Although a limitation 
such as this would not necessarily prevent the government from 
gaining initial access to information that individuals wish to keep 
private, it would serve as a means of reducing how much 
information is shared among governmental agencies, copied, and 
saved for future review. Perhaps the government could require 
probable cause of possessing contraband in order for border 
agents to share or copy any material. In addition, DHS should set 
a solid guideline as to how long a search of a laptop or other 
electronic device may last, rather than allowing a search to last 
for a “reasonable period of time,”227 which in some cases could last 
hours or days.228 Sales suggests that longer searches may involve a 
greater violation of privacy rights because customs or 
immigration officers might browse “through entirely innocent but 
sensitive” data while hunting for contraband.229 Therefore, 
searches of electronic devices, absent reasonable suspicion of 
contraband, should be limited to a short period of time, such as 
one hour or ninety minutes.  
CONCLUSION 
Several years ago, cloud computing was merely a buzz-
word that held little meaning to those who worked outside of 
the technology realm. Today, however, technology experts 
predict that the cloud will predominate the desktop by 2020, 
meaning that most computer users will access software 
applications and information through the cloud.230 The problems 
  
 225 Sales, supra note 18, at 1124.  
 226 Id. at 1125.  
 227 CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 12, § 5.3.1. 
 228 See supra note 19. 
 229 Sales, supra note 18, at 1130. 
 230 JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON ET AL., THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
(Pew Research Ctr. Publ’ns, June 11, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 
1623/future-cloud-computing-technology-experts. 
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posed by the intersection between cloud computing and the border 
search doctrine have not yet been addressed by the government or 
the courts. However, it is clear that electronic files can be 
searched at the border.231 So, in an effort to avoid electronic 
searches at the border, travelers might turn to the cloud based on 
an assumption that data on remote servers are immune from the 
border search doctrine. Sex offenders might upload images or 
videos to the cloud of child exploitation. Money launderers might 
unknowingly store pertinent e-mail exchanges on a cloud service. 
And terrorists might save information about nuclear material or 
video clips of how to detonate a bomb to their clouds.232 The 
proliferation of cloud computing will most definitely result in a 
need for a clear border-patrol policy to be established. 
Absent a clear policy, however, American jurisprudence 
signifies that law enforcement officials should have the authority 
to access information on the cloud by invoking the border search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Congress and the courts 
have always granted border agencies plenary power in searching 
the people and property that cross international borders.233 These 
border agencies serve as the first barrier in preventing 
contraband and security threats from entering the United States. 
Privacy rights have consistently been forced to yield to the 
interests of the American government in accomplishing such 
prevention, even with regard to electronic data. Precluding 
border officers from accessing information that travelers store on 
cloud servers, rather than on local hard drives, would severely 
undermine our government’s ability to ward off smuggled and 
illegal goods, and it would increase the United States’ 
vulnerability to terrorism. Rather, a policy granting border 
officials a broad authority to search information stored on the 
cloud is much more aligned with the Supreme Court and U.S. 
Courts of Appeals’ border search doctrine jurisprudence.  
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